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Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein on Grammar: A Few Observations

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ABSTRACT

Irrespective of spatiotemporal limitations of the world's intellectual history, discussions on the language have attracted considerable attention of philosophers, linguists, and even the public. The topics of such discussions have also included the meaning, nature or function/s, and necessity of grammar while diverse arguments have been raised both in support and against even its ontic presence. Among the philosophers from all ages who attempted to analyze the foundation of those arguments, i.e. the common notion that grammar is prescriptive and fruit of pedagogical instructions, Bhartṛhari(c. 450 - 510 C.E.) stands significant because of the richness and legitimacy of his arguments at such an early age of history. More than a millennium later, Ludwig Wittgenstein as a highly influential philosopher from the last century shows some relationship with Bhartrhari in (re)confirming that our common construal of grammar cannot be valid because of its non-prescriptive nature. While attempting to examine the ways in which Bhartṛhari and Wittgenstein have interpreted grammar, this paper succinctly investigates each philosopher approaches towards the language in use.

Keywords: Bhartṛhari, Wittgenstein, grammar, *Vākyapadīya*, philosophy of language, meaning

Introduction

This brief study seeks to examine the ways in which the great Sanskrit grammarian Bhartṛhari (c. 450 -510 C.E.) and Austrian philosopher and Cambridge don Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) construe "grammar", and in doing so how each philosopher stands out within the precincts of his philosophical setting. It would be imprecise to state that their construals of grammar are parallel and no discrepancies between their explanations exist but what Wittgenstein tried to interpret as the grammar within his life as a philosopher does not disagree much with what Bhartṛhari posits along similar lines. However, in later periods of his matured philosophical life, Wittgenstein changed the direction of his stream of thought at several stages and interpolated, amended and even criticized what he had written in his previous works. Bhartṛhari's apparently static stance on grammar is found most profoundly presented in his magnum opus, the *Vākyapadīya* (VP), which is considered to be an influential work on the Indian philosophy of grammar. One may counterargue that Bhartṛhari's work is an ancient treatise,the originality of the content of which we do not witness, yet Wittgenstein's works are known to all today. On the other hand, Bhartṛhari was able to review at ease all the centuries-old discourses on language up to him and encapsulate the essence of the grammarians' perspective on language, with the underpinning of the Advaita Vedantic theology.Nevertheless, Europe had not enjoyed many serious philosophical treatments of language until Wittgenstein took the initiative. Consequently, the help Wittgenstein received from other philosophers, both his predecessors and contemporaries including Schopenhauer, Frege and Russell, was rather limited.

On the Term Grammar

Wittgenstein opted the term *Grammatik* to denote what he believed to mirror the reality, i.e., linguistic rules.[1] In early Wittgenstein we may trace extensive discussions on the arbitrariness of language and grammar. Language or linguistic rules do not consider any putative essence or form of reality. Another vital aspect of Wittgensteinian insights into linguistic rules is that they can be recognized as neither 'correct' nor 'incorrect'.[2] Like Leibniz, Russell[3] and Frege[4] who believed in an ideal language fully capable of depicting the reality, Wittgenstein was not a 'linguistic foundationalist' to the core. In other words, Wittgenstein hesitated or did not hurry to declare that language (or 'linguistic rules' in its technical sense) is rich enough to describe the reality as it *is*. As Hacker (1986) observes, Wittgenstein knew the absurdity of the postulation that natural languages might be 'logically defective' and one might devise a 'better' or a 'logically more perfect' language.[5] This stance of Wittgenstein is quite significant, for he thereby gets closer to the Indian viewpoints on the ineffability (*anirvācyatā*)[6] of the reality or the inadequacy of language that we use for articulating the reality. Likewise, the *apoha* (lit. taking away) theory of exclusion in the Buddhist philosophical approach to semantics also highlights the ineffability of the reality by suggesting that 'exclusion of the other' would be an alternative.

The desire for finding a way to interpret the reality as required is not novel to discussions on the Indian philosophy of language although the reality has highly been 'theologized' in Indian religiophilosophical contexts. Further, the multiplicity of technical terms in the Indian interpretations of the reality might be

daunting. The term 'grammar' in English translates into Sanskrit as '*vyākaraṇa*' (*vi + ā + √kṛ*> lit. revelation or analysis) but Bhartṛhari's use of it in the VP is rather philosophical[7]compared to that of Pāṇini, whose overall intention was to burden the natural flux of language by keeping it 'intact or unpolluted',with the help of fixed rules. Sanskrit grammarians preferred to employ the term *vyākaraṇa* to denote a pedagogical discipline[8]whereas philosophers deemed it to be the overall understanding of language in use.

Wittgenstein's Coinage: Logical Grammar
Logical syntax or logical grammar[9], as is described particularly in early Wittgensteinian philosophy, lies hidden behind the surface of language. One requires 'logical analysis' or the process of identifying the components of a proposition, thought or fact, to discover it, and the way/s in which they are combined.[10] Wittgenstein's notion of logical analysis gained impetus through the invention of the predicate calculus by Frege who used 'concept-script' to liberate 'thought' from the tyranny of words.[11] This is a significant position of Wittgenstein as it underscores the inability or "poverty" of ordinary language to explain the reality in a *logical* manner. Nevertheless, such a position does not entail that grammar or logical analysis remains entirely capable of telling us the nature of reality. This presumably ambiguous explanation, however, requires a careful examination in order to apprehend what Wittgenstein wanted to convey thereby. Speaking of grammar Wittgenstein tends to underline that 'distrust of grammar is the first requisite for philosophizing' because grammar causes philosophical confusions.[12]He also believes that ordinary language is not an ideal language but instead, an ideal *notation* that shows the 'logical structure' already present in ordinary propositions. Nonetheless, by believing so, Wittgenstein is not ready to discard the potentiality of ordinary language, as it is still capable of expressing every sense.[13]It would be ambiguous and misleading to postulate that Wittgenstein belittles the importance of grammar by explaining its failure to picture the reality 'as it is envisaged to be' and it's being a/the cause of philosophical confusions. In another discourse, he seems to give grammar some credits as capable of mirroring the reality, if the term 'grammar' can be considered to have equally been used in different contexts.[14]Moreover, by the term *grammar* he presumably denotes two explicitly different layers of language, i.e., (a) the grammar we learn academically and (b) the grammar which lies behind our speech, regulating whatever we speak or write. Wittgenstein prefers to use "school-grammar (*schulgrammatik*)" [15]for the former and "logical grammar/ logical syntax (*logischen grammatik/logischen syntax*)"for the latter.[16]However, such a dichotomy does not postulate, as I understand, that"logical grammar - or "philosophical grammar" as Wittgenstein uses in some contexts - employs a set of special rules 'more vital' than those in school-grammar. Rather, logical grammar aims at discussing and thereby tries to interpret (and resolve?) philosophical problems more clearly and perspicuously. A perusal of Wittgensteinian insights into this conception may help philosophers to distinguish philosophical grammar from school grammar though some interlocutors of Wittgenstein, such as Moore, present counterargument.

Now we may note some prominent differences between those two types of grammar.[17]

i.   Logical/ philosophical grammar is not concerned with exactness or comprehensiveness for its own sake.
ii. It does not deal with the history of language or genetic problems in general.
iii. Many languages often share the features of logical grammar.
iv. It has a wider and functional conception of grammatical rules.

Similarly, the dichotomy between 'depth grammar (*Tiefengrammatik*)' and 'surface grammar (*Oberflächengrammatik*)'[18] as is found in Wittgenstein's philosophy remains important and sits close to the school grammar-logical grammar differentiation discussed above. Emphasized there is also that philosophy has little to do with surface grammar even if it pleases grammarians to the full. If philosophy lands on surface grammar, Wittgenstein illustrates, it will be as absurd or erroneous as 'classifying clouds by their shape'.[19]Thus depth grammar itself is eligible for telling us the 'logical form of the reality'.[20]

Grammar in Practice
What Wittgenstein purports in describing grammar as a *normative* practice may be similar to the position found in the VP that the *madhyamā*, the intermediate stratum of linguistic thoughts in Bhartṛhari's speech stratification, maintains our speech activity. Wittgenstein's terminology includes grammar as normative

because it is binding in a way that the rules of a game are binding, and as Finch (1977) notes, in a way that social conventions are binding.[21] It is like people do activities customarily rather than being invariably guided and instructed by somebody to do them.

How does the VP interpret the *madhyamā* and the *sphoṭa* in telling us the function/s of grammar? Unlike Bhartṛhari whose concise and highly technical explanations would have remained enigmatic unless commentated on later, Wittgenstein in the PI explains [22] how we understand what we hear[23] and what we need for that activity. Wittgenstein uses a number of examples from a pragmatic perspective of life to substantiate what he wants us to understand about the normativeness of grammar. The allegory of following a signpost, for instance, clearly shows that "to follow the rules of *grammar*" is also an activity, which we have to teach ourselves first, and then we follow *customarily*.[24] In other words, grammar is used in the process of understanding what we hear in a similar way that we become "trained in or accustomed to" something we encounter daily without keeping inquiring it each time. If we map this fine illustration onto the VP's interpretation of understanding, the *madhyamā* stratum transforms what is grasped at the *vaikharī*, the surface level of our language practices, through the *vaikṛtadhvani*[25] into a set of mental impressions (*saṃskāra*) in order to let *sphoṭa* reveal the meaning(s). Upon the completion of this transformation (*āvṛttipāka*) is manifested the meaning of what is heard (or seen if visual sign-recognition processes applied hereto). Bhartṛhari's explanation of this process is explicated with the help of the concept *pratibhā*,[26] which is another technical term shared by many disciplines and with which we may have some comparative observations. For example, It is evident from Wittgenstein's idea that 'to understand a sentence means to understand a language' [27] (and vice versa) that comprehension of a language facilitates one to understand verbal expressions and communicate in that very language. Similarly, Bhartṛhari posits that the *pratibhā*, the innate know-how awareness, is intrinsically possessed and improved by everyone. This know-how awareness which becomes matured in keeping with life experiences is equal to the animals' knowledge that makes them intrinsically understand how to do things in their life.[28] Accordingly *pratibhā* lets us do what we have been 'trained'[29]to do and, in the case of understanding, lets the *sphoṭa* reveal the meaning of what we hear. As a result, we are inclined to call our doing so 'customary' and the more we practice a specific activity within our life span the better, the more 'naturally', the less tiresomely we do it. As Wittgenstein nicely observes we do not "follow" rules of language, a labyrinth of paths privately[30], *viz.* we are not guided by specific rules so that we may differentiate ours from common use, simply because 'obeying a rule' is customary and common to all speaking the language concerned. Then it derives that logical grammar, as Wittgenstein explains, bears many attributes of the *madhyamā* stratum where all the possible combinatorial properties of speech rest, being subject to transformation.[31] Further, to paraphrase by borrowing Wittgensteinianterminology, the *madhyamā* can also be called 'the account book of language which shows the actual transaction of language' in contrast to the *vaikharī* stratum dealing with all idiosyncratic peculiarities of articulation. By means of grasping these transactions is achieved our 'firm understanding of the bounds of sense'.[32]

Grammar as a Mirror
In a different context, Wittgenstein considers 'grammar' as the *informer* of the "true nature" of something.[33] If he uses the term "grammar" there in the sense that grammar helps us understand what lies beyond the objects of our sensory perception, Wittgenstein again comes to agree with Bhartṛhari's speech stratification and how the reality is revealed to us. Bhartṛhari's construal of 'grammar' would be too laconic if it is to be placed vis-à-vis Wittgenstein's because the latter position has to be deciphered through a number of philosophical discourses on grammar and language heavily amended and criticized. A significant difference between what Bhartṛhari believes to be grammar and Wittgenstein's explanation thereof is that Bhartṛhari theorizes that the reality is the 'subject matter' of grammar while Wittgenstein prefers to accept that the reality is mirrored in grammar.[34]In Wittgenstein's philosophization, grammar is, therefore, something like a mirror capable of mirroring the reality, which does not manifest except through that 'mirror'. Grammatical forms, as Wittgenstein explains, include those of natural language and of artificial calculi alike.[35]If we may accept that mirroring is nothing but 'depicting-something-exactly-as-it-is' Wittgenstein also belongs to a sort of linguistic foundationalism somehow or other. Otherwise, we do perceive that a 'mirrored image' undergoes 'certain' changes such as 'reversing left and right' but still gives us a 'specular reflection' as perfect as what is before a mirror. Moreover, mirroring produces an exact copy of the original but depending on properties of a mirror's surface such as plane, concave or convex the

reflection undergoes certain changes. The ontic presence of the object before the mirror is unarguable but the reflection is, unarguably, *not* the real object.

We may recall the sheer similarity between the *sphoṭa* and the *nāda* as interpreted in the VP where Bhartṛhari elucidates with an effective simile how the reality, which is unique and single in the Advaita Vedanta theology, seems differentiated and multiple. The word-reality or *śabdatattva* is reflected in our daily speech practices.Just like a mountain whose reflection is seen differentiated in various surfaces such an on the water of a lake, in a mirror or on a polished blade of a sword, the word-reality seems varied from one to another.[36] Despite the distortion of reflections due to differentiated surfaces, the real object exists undifferentiated. Our speech practices are akin to those varied reflections yet the word-reality behind is like the real object. However, later Wittgensteinian views on this matter encounter serious contradictions to what he says in his earlier works because his mature thoughts compelled him to observe the apparent structure of the reality as just the *shadow* of grammar.[37] He further wants us to understand that the world and language as the tool we use to define it can not be considered to be two areas but the distinction lies between what represents and what is represented. In that position of Wittgenstein, language alias logical grammar is no longer a 'mirror' to reflect the reality because it is *we* who provide words with definitions. This is the thesis that leads to the Wittgensteinian supposition that grammatical rules are arbitrary.

Arbitrary Grammar

Why are grammatical rules defined as arbitrary? Wittgenstein allocates a considerable portion of his philosophical construal to interpret this idea. However, the later Wittgensteinian view was that grammar is non-arbitrary.[38] What he states in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) on this matter[39] is repudiated on the grounds that grammar has to mirror the multiplicity of facts and the essence of language (of grammatical rules) is a picture of the essence of the world.[40] Grammar constitutes our *form of representation* and thus, though not responsible for the reality, it does determine what counts as a representation of reality.[41]

Wittgenstein's admittance that grammatical rules are arbitrary consists of three major aspects.

      (a) Grammar is self-contained and not responsible to extralinguistic reality,
      (b) Grammatical rules cannot be justified
      (c) Alternative forms of representation are not irrational in an absolute sense.[42]

The first aspect as entertained by Wittgensteinian philosophy can be examined as both close to and distant from the Bhartṛhari's viewpoints on how understanding happens and is communicated to others. Grammar thrives self-contained as *we* ascribe meanings to signs by means of adopting some standards of 'linguistic correctness' and by giving reasons for our use of them in a certain way.[43] As a grammarian-cum-philosopher Bhartṛhari stresses in the VP how we "shape" the language in a way that we need it to be, for words themselves have no meanings. Apparently, this view was not Bhartṛhari's own but one he postulates in the light of what his predecessor philosophers and grammarians maintained. Pronunciation of a certain word with its accent shifted from one phoneme to another, for instance, leads to making 'two words' of different meanings as Pāṇini explains in detail in his momentous grammatical treatise titled *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.[44] Moreover, the theory of suggested meaning (*dhvanivāda*) that revolutionized Sanskrit literary criticism shows in an array of widespread discourses that the meaning of a certain set of words is in their usage but not in their etymology or conventionality. Consequently, as Wittgenstein reasonably concludes, the meaning of words is not determined by the (grammatical) rules we use but by the actual usage of them in applied language practices. His famous response to the Lockean idea of 'real essence', which is exemplified by what we have to say finally regarding fake gold and real gold, proves that grammar is self-contained.

Wittgenstein outlines that grammatical rules are more similar to the rules of a game, to those of chess for example than to those of our physical activities like cookery. If one does not follow the rules pertaining to cookery he may end up with an undesired result.[45] Put differently, it will not be the *customary* result of the set of rules we are expected to follow. Grammar rules, unlike cookery rules, do not expect to have an "end" because, being impossible to be breached, a certain meaning has already been ascribed to 'every combinatorial possibility of the depth grammar' of language. As a result, breached grammatical rules may

leave us speaking 'something else', which is unexpected by the customary combinatorial possibility of the words we choose, but not 'something *bad*'. Further, this view elucidates that there are no rules that can be introduced as 'correct rules' or 'incorrect rules' though such a distinction are observed in 'school grammar'. Wittgenstein further clarifies this concept with the help of the analogy of our using a unit of measurement for a certain purpose, just like measuring the perimeter of a lake in millimetres, which can be labelled as neither 'accurate' nor 'inaccurate' but rather as *inconvenient*. To exemplify this situation we may turn towards the Indian philosophy as well. For instance, an argumentative account of the overgeneralizing of grammar rules is given in Yāska's exposition of the rules of etymological meanings of word-stems. One of such arguments is that if the word-stem '√aś' which the noun 'aśva' (horse) derives from is ascribed the infinitive meaning 'to run', all other nouns whose meaning is 'that who/which runs' are supposed to derive from the same stem. Yāska in his *Nirukta* discusses that language cannot be bound with such hard rules as rules are 'secondary'. A similar account is found regarding the *Uṇādisūtras*of Pāṇinian grammar where the stems of some words in use cannot be located. Nevertheless, it does not mean that such words must be labelled as 'ungrammatical'. Nor can they be removed from use simply because of our inability to trace their origin.[46]

Another aspect of language autonomy, as Wittgenstein underscores, is that grammatical rules cannot be justified because their goal is not instrumental as is the case in an activity like cookery. The goal of grammatical rules is conceptual.[47]It is not facts but the proposition that we have to use in order to support grammatical rules. Wittgensteinian also accepts that language can be explained only by language and it has no purpose beyond itself. We cannot resort to the world for justification of our grammatical rules because the direction of our gaze is guided by the very rules whose rationale we seek. The stance that there are no extra-linguistic or pre-conceptual perspectives outside grammar meets heavily argued views in the Indian philosophy where the language is placed on a metaphysical ground attributing to it a sort of 'divinity'.[48] (It is interesting to note here that the reality is also contemplated to be 'metaphysical' rather than remaining within the parameters of physics in the philosophical discourse of both Wittgenstein and Bhartṛhari). However, as Wittgenstein believes, the sole point of saying that grammar is arbitrary is to undermine any attempt at justification[49] but not to ascertain that, as Glock (1996: 50) notes, it is 'irrelevant, discretionary, easily alterable or a matter of individual choice.'

Conclusion

Given the above discussion, it is safe to derive that among what separates Wittgenstein from Bhartṛhari on the exposition of grammar is also a set of mutually contradictory thoughts as to how "grammar" should be used to understand the meaning of a linguistic expression. For Wittgenstein, language is more than a calculus but a game (*sprachspiel*)[50] and, in consequence, also a rule-guided activity. Here Wittgenstein appears to prescribe a sort of normative rule-following needed for understanding though he says in another discourse that there do not exist 'specific rules' or 'better rules'.In contrast, Bhartṛhari's position does not require language users to follow any prescriptive steps as understanding remains beyond the reach of the rational mind but in the '*buddhi*' which is the transpersonal faculty of the mind. *Sphoṭa* sits in *buddhi*[51] and becomes mature by experience, improving its own capability for manifesting meaning. Unlike such a kind of 'automated process of understanding' inBhartṛhari's construal, Wittgenstein's emphasis is attached to the idea that understanding as a process requires one to follow pertaining rules. Accordingly, Wittgenstein seems to be a more prescriptive grammarian one in the Indian tradition. What Wittgenstein apparently neglects in his explanation of understanding and rule-following is that, though one learns rules of a language, i.e., school grammar,since his childhood he does not repeat them *each and every time* deliberately as they become the 'logical structure' of *his* language, which effortlessly becomes present to him when speaking.[52] On the other hand, the VP does by no means stand against the fact that we learn the rules of language from other users, usually, elders of the speaking community concerned. Further, understanding does follow 'a process' but beyond the control of the listener's rational mind. To investigate whether Wittgenstein received any influence on his reading of 'language-game' fromBhartṛhari's interpretation of 'non-deliberate process of understanding' would also be interesting particularly because later Wittgensteinian philosophy underscores that language-games are 'rooted in our *natural* reactions and activities'.[53]Any attempt to recognize the relationships or differences between the intercontinental philosophical thoughts on language would contribute to the expansion of our current understanding of every strand of such thoughts better and deeper.

References

[1] Some admit "grammar" to be the most 'general' term that describes what Wittgenstein himself was most concerned with. See: Finch 1977: 149. Further, for many philosophers after Wittgenstein, the use of that term remained 'ambiguous' or 'not very clear'. See: Moor 1962: 271.

[2]Whether Wittgenstein intends to introduce them here as 'neutral' is of much importance and worth examining critically. When explaining why grammatical rules are arbitrary he appears to think that it is 'inconvenient' for us to use them.

[3] Russell 1956:185-234, 338.

[4] Frege 1979: 266.

[5] Hacker 1986: 150.

[6] VP (P) 1.1
Wittgenstein on 'sayability' or saying/showing doctrine seems equivalent to *anirvācyatā*(ineffability) in terms of the approach to it.

[7] For example *vyākaraṇa* is exalted as what remains next to the supreme reality or the noblest austerity of the austerities.
VP 1.11 *āsannaṃ brahmaṇastasya tapasāmuttamaṃ tapaḥ | prathamaṃ chandasāmaṅgamāhurvyākaraṇaṃ budhāḥ*.
The commentators on this verse delineate that grammar helps those ignorant of sacred words (believed to be the reality) 'infer' them ("*āsannaṃ sākṣādupakārī*" in the *Vṛtti*; "*āsannaṃ avyavahitaṃ*" in the *Paddhati*). They only infer (*anumīyante*) but do not perceive the reality as it is.

[8] This consideration presumably led Indian poets to insult poetasters with an academic knowledge of grammar but without intuition or poetic license.
cf. Kāvyālaṅkāra (KL) 1.5*gurūpadeśāddhyetuṃ śāstraṃ jaḍadhiyopyalam | Kāvyaṃ hi jāyate jātu kasyacit pratibhāvataḥ*
Note that teaching of Sanskrit grammar also requires one's 'memorization' of rules. The succinct aphoristic meta rules authorized by Pāṇinian grammar are examples.

[9] TLP 3.325

[10] Glock 1996: 203.

[11] Frege 1979: 6-7, 253, 269-70.

[12] NL 106; RUL 11.13; TLP 3.323f., 4.003f.; WAM 57

[13] TLP 4.002

[14] A similar ambiguity is caused by Bhartṛhari's manifold use of the technical terms '*śabda*' as it refers,depending on the context, to the supreme reality, the meaning-bearer *sphoṭa*, sounds we hear with the ears. cf. Shastri 1983: xxvi, 10, 161.

[15] M 69, LWL 97-98

[16] TLP 3.325

[17] AWL 31, 96-97 ; BT 413 ; PG 190; PI 2.230; Z §§ 464-4465

[18] PI 1.664

[19] LC 2; AWL 46; PI §§ 10-14; Z § 462

[20] Logical grammar is intended to provide a complete analysis of propositions. Two major functions are performed by such an analysis. Rizvi 1987: 35. "It shows how the apparent logical form of a proposition may differ from its real logical form. And second, but more importantly, such an analysis demonstrates how the real logical form is a necessary prerequisite for sense and is thus present in every proposition. And since each proposition has one and only one correct analysis, a complete grammatical analysis also shows how combinations of names in composite propositions depict complex states of affairs…'

[21] Finch 1977: 158.

[22] PI 1.138-142

[23] PI 1.167 Wittgenstein notes that our familiarity with the 'look of a word' is similar to that with how it sounds. He starts here a rich discussion on the topic.
cf. PI 1.171 "when one reads, letters and sound form a unity-as it were an alloy. (in the same way e.g. the faces of famous men and the sound of their names are fused together…) "
This construal of visual signs and their audible counterparts may be elaborated in line with the Indian philosophical discussions on memory traces (*dhāraṇā*). Note how Vṛṣabhadeva comments on the VP. 1.19, that the characteristics of words are remembered the way the audible forms of letters are remembered when the visual forms of letters, forms of animals and so on are seen.
'*yathākṣarasmṛteḥ cihnāni lipyakṣarāṇi siṃhākṛtyādīni vā. yatastaddarśanādakṣarasmaraṇaṃ, tathā vāco nimittānyunkīrṇānīva bhāsante*'

[24] PI 1.198

[25]One may argue here how the *vaikharī* stratum processes visual signs as the *vaikṛtadhvani* are concerned with 'sounds'.

[26] Puṇyarāja prefers to ascribe equivalent attributes of the *paśyantī* stratum to the *pratibhā*. VP(P) 2.149

[27] PI 1.199

Wittgenstein in the PG delineates that understanding is a mental process, viz. a psychological phenomenon and may be compared to a brain-process. *vide*. PG 41, 42

We may compare the 'understanding as a process' in Wittgensteinian thoughts with the account of a similar topic in the VP 1.91with the support of its *vṛtti*. The transformation of what we hear into what we understand is compared to the process of 'milk becoming curd'. The steps of such a continuum are innumerable and undistinguishable from each other.

[28] According to Bhartṛhari, it is due to the *pratibhā* that spider weaves his cobweb, birds make their nests and cuckoo sings in the spring. Here he seems to stress it as one's innate potentiality, which matures with life experience. VP 143-152, also see Bhartṛhari's own *vṛtti* on them.

However, if the *pratibhā* in the VP is to be construed as *intuition*, which Wittgenstein states as 'an unnecessary shuffle' (PI 1.213), it may need further examination because in the context of Indian philosophy the former means our intrinsic potentiality that helps us to engage in and enjoy aesthetic activities. The English Sanskrit terms may not necessarily bear equal meaning.

[29] Note how Wittgenstein deals with our 'being trained' to do something, PI 1.508, Z 6

[30] PI 1.202-203

[31]Cf . Hacker 1986: 152."Language is the means of representation. Its <u>inner structure</u>, constituted by the rules which determine the use of sentences and their constituents is the form of representation, <u>the web of conceptual connections</u> by means of which we conceive of the world."My emphasis underlined.

[32]Hacker 1986: 152

[33] PI 1.373'Grammar tells us <u>what kind of object anything is</u>. (Theology as grammar.)' My emphasis underlined.

[34]Again, interestingly, Wittgenstein notes that 'Grammar is not accountable to any reality' (PG 133). While discussing the ostensive definition of grammar, Wittgenstein questions the capability of grammar rules to 'point to' and to 'represent' the reality.

[35] Hacker 1986: 175.

[36] VP 1.50

Bhartṛhari finely elaborates this in his *vṛtti* as follows.'*tatsvapakṣe'nyatvapakṣe vā candrādipratibimbaṃ yatrādhāre saṃsṛṣṭamivopalabhyate na hi tattathā. tattu niṣkriyamapi toyataraṅgādikriyādharmopagraheṇaiva toyādīnāṃ bhinnāṃ pravṛttimanupatatyeva. prākṛtasya vaikṛtasya ca nādasya hrasvadīrghapluteṣu drutamadhyamavilambitāsu ca vṛttiṣu tāvāneva sphoṭo vicitrāṃ vṛttimanuvidhatte…*'

cf. Vṛṣabhadeva's *paddhati* on this vṛtti and Puṇyarāja's commentary on VP 1.50.

[37] Hacker 1986: 179-214. Hacker (1986: 185) states that "in the Tractatus he had understood the nature of ostensive definition… he had confused the shadow cast upon reality by samples belonging to our method of representation with metaphysical samples constituting the substance of the world."

[38] Z § 358

[39] TLP 5.551

[40] LWL 8-10; PR 85

[41] PG 88, 133; PI 1.371-373

[42] Glock 1996: 46-50

[43] BB 27-28

[44]*Aṣṭādhyāyī* (A) 4.2.74 '*udak ca vipāśaḥ.*'Here Pāṇini elaborates how the word '*dātta*' (the water-well prepared by one named Dātta) gets two different meanings, depending on the geographical location of a speech community. Pronounced *dātta* (with the first elongated vowel accentuated), it shows the usage in the north bank of the Vipāś River, whereas *dāttá* (with the last vowel accentuated)is how people on the south bank call that water-well. In addition, he exemplifies that word meanings and the objects they stand for are not projected onto the reality by their mere presence but by adopting rules/standards to ascertain their use.

[45] PG 133, Z 320

[46]Cf. A. 3.3.1 (*uṇādayo bahulam*), 3.4.75 (*tābhyām anyatra-uṇādayaḥ*)

For a few extensive discussions on the 'arbitrariness' of linguistic rules, including the role of verbs as tense-markers, disputations over grammatical gender, meaning acquisition from homonyms-homophones, see: Raja (1955: 191-222), Shastri (1963: 112-119), Jha (1908: 164-168), Shastri (1964: 41-54), Shastri (1952: 89-104), Ganguli (1967: 38-42), Bhattacharya (1950: 133-141), Brough (1952: 73-77), Cardona (1965: 225-238).

[47] Z §§320-322; PI 1.491-496; PG 184-185, 190-194

[48] Cf. Shastri 1983: 1-44

[49] Z 331. "One is tempted to justify rules of grammar by sentences like 'But there really are four primary colors'. And the saying that the rules of grammar are arbitrary is directed against the possibility of this justification, which is constructed on the model of justifying a sentence by pointing to what verifies it."Cf. Hacker 1986: 188-189and Glock 1996: 47-48.

[50] BB 17, 108, PI § 7, OC §§ 554-559, PG 62

[51] VP 1.84'*āvṛttiparipākāyāṃ buddhau śabdo 'vadhāryate*'

The *sphoṭa* as is believed to be in the intuitive intelligence or in the transpersonal faculty of the mind, which is enhanced by experience. It varies depending on the extent of one's intellect. Consequently, 'my *sphoṭa*' is different

from 'somebody else's *sphoṭa* '. This view on *sphoṭa* compels us to compare it with the Wittgensteinian attitude toward world which each individual creates, possesses, and leaves at death. (cf. TLP 6.431). Thus a happy man's world differs from the unhappy man's (NB 29.-30.7.16; TLP 6.43). It would also be of philosophical importance to link this supposition with the Buddhist view on how one creates and lives within one's personal world.

cf. *Suttapiṭaka*, *Aṅguttara nikāya* (2) 4.1.5.6. (*Dutiyarohitassasutta*)

'*api cāhaṃ āvuso imasmiṃ yeva byāmamatte kalebare saññimhi samanake lokañca paññāpemi lokasamudayañca lokanirodhañca lokanirodhagāminiñca paṭipadanti.*'

[52]Further examination is required to confirm whether Wittgenstein discussed the language use of the matured.

[53] RPP1.§916, RPP 2. §453, OC §§ 402-403, 559

Abbreviations

A	Aṣṭādhyāyī
ABORI	Annals of the Bhāṇḍarkar Oriental Research Institute
ALB	The Adyar Library Bulletin
AWL	Wittgenstein's Lectures from Ambrose's Notes
BB	The Blue and Brown Books
BṛU	Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad
BT	The 'Big Typescript' partly on PO
CR	The Calcutta Review
JGJRI	Journal of Gaṅgānāth Jhā Research Institute
JOR	Journal of Oriental Research
KD	Kāvyādarśa
KL	Kavyālaṅkāra
KVRACV	Prof. K.V. Raṅgaswāmi AiyangarCommemoration Volume – Madras
L	Language
LC	Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and ReligiousBelief
LM	Laghumañjuṣā
LWL	Wittgenstein's Lectures from Lee'sNotes
M	Wittgenstein's Lectures in Moore'sPhilosophical Papers
MB	Mahābhāṣya
MBP	Mahābhāṣyapradīpa
MBU	Mahābhaṣyodyota
MS	Mīmāṃsāsūtra
MU	Muṇḍakopaniṣad
NB	Notebooks
NL	Notes on Logic
OC	On Certainty
OH	Our Heritage
PG	Philosophical Grammar
PI	Philosophical Investigations
PLM	Paramalaghumañjuṣā
PO	Poona Orientalist
PR	Philosophical Remarks
PTIOC	Proceedings and Transactions of theAll-India Oriental Conference
RLF	Some remarks on logical form
RPP I	Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1945-1947)
RPP II	Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (1948)
RUL	Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore
SD	Śivadṛṣṭi
TLP	Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
TPSL	Transactions of Philological Society - London
TV	Tantravārtika
UCJDL	University of Calcutta Journal of the Department of Letters
VP	Vākyapadīya
VP (P)	Vākyapadīya Puṇyarāja's commentary
VSIPVK	A Volume of Studies in IndologyPresented to Prof. P.V.Kane
WAM	Ludwig Wittgenstein – A Memoir by Malcolm
YV	Yogavasiṣṭa
Z	Zettel

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